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Executive Summary 
I.  Status of the EU ETS and strategic challenges  
Although the EU emissions trading scheme (ETS) has been adopted in a very short period of 
time, implementation is far from complete. In many respects, the EU ETS is still under 
construction with many critical elements of the infrastructure missing. Therefore, it is too early 
to pass (final) judgement on it. Nevertheless, a number of areas that will need further attention 
in the forthcoming review can be identified. They include the environmental effectiveness, lack 
of harmonisation, allocation methodologies including new entrants and closure rules and 
impacts on competitiveness, sector coverage, the way an international carbon market could 
emerge as well as the question on whether ultimately the ETS will support the development and 
diffusion of new and breakthrough technologies.  
II. Key messages 
The ETS Review  
1.  The objective of the EU ETS is to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in a cost-effective way 
and contribute to meeting the EU’s Kyoto Protocol targets. In order for the EU ETS to meet 
this objective, there is a need to improve existing implementation, notably by ensuring real 
reductions, increasing consistency and transparency, improving allocation methodologies or 
in some cases, outright harmonisation. In addition, the EU ETS faces a number of long-term 
challenges to make the EU ETS fit for the post-2012 period: allocation methodology, sector 
coverage, investment incentives for the short and medium term and incentives for R&D for 
new, breakthrough technologies and linking with other emerging carbon markets.  
Investment 
2.  In the long-term, a critical element for meeting the climate change challenge will be the 
development and diffusion of low-carbon technologies. One of the main criticisms with 
regard to the ETS has been that it discourages rather than encourages investment in new and 
low-carbon technologies. To an extent this is result of international indecision, which in 
return reduces predictability and has been partly the reason for short-term allocation 
periods. Some of the causes however are closer to home, notably the allocation 
methodologies that create wrong incentives, particularly regarding new entrants and closure 
rules. Similarly, fuel-specific allocation may have perverse effects on investment from a 
carbon perspective.  
a)  The most immediate area where investment incentives can be improved are first, new 
entrants and closure rules followed by a more general consideration of allocation 
methodologies (e.g. benchmarking or auctioning).  
b)  Most of the new investment will take place in the power sector (with an estimated 
investment need of between 500 and 600 GW for the period 2000-2030) and to some 
extent in the refining industry. Measures to increase investment incentives towards low-
carbon technologies will need to focus on these two sectors, where also definitions for 
new capacity are easier than in energy-intensive sectors. 
c)  Both predictability and flexibility would be increased by separating allocation 
methodologies from setting the cap. The allocation methodology could be fixed while 
the cap could be subject to future developments, within the EU and internationally. 
Some predictability on principles for future cap setting would be preferable since this 
will determine allowance price. 
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3.  A second, more fundamental question is whether in the medium and long term the ETS 
could become a tool to provide significant incentives to develop and bring to the market 
new breakthrough technologies, i.e. make R&D on a huge scale profitable. In this case, 
price signals would need to be high enough and credible (i.e. provide long-term 
predictability) in order to activate a significant amount of private resources for R&D. This is 
not the case currently; long-term price signals are neither high nor credible enough to 
stimulate new breakthrough technologies although this should be expected at this early 
stage of development. Nevertheless, additional measures, such as technology policies may 
be needed, including R&D subsidies. 
Allocation methodologies 
4.  There is consensus that new entrants and closure rules should be harmonised but 
disagreement on how. This paper has presented three principal options. Proposal 1 is to 
auction for new entrants as this gives stronger signals for low carbon investment but may 
delay somewhat the investment (as it puts new investment at a relative disadvantage to 
incumbents as they are overcompensated by free allocation). Proposal 2 is to give new 
entrants allowances for free – based on fuel-neutral benchmarks – as this might bring new 
investment to the market at the lower power  price as would be with auctioning.  New 
investment will bring power prices down as efficiency goes up and overall carbon content in 
power down.  The downside is that it provides generally weaker signals for low-carbon 
investment than auctioning. As the two options aim at different objectives
3 they constitute a 
trade-off. Option 3 is to treat new entrants and incumbents alike, i.e. the same degree of free 
allocation and auctioning. This provides stronger signals towards low-carbon investment 
and thereby could have a positive effect on power prices while ensuring equal treatment of 
incumbents and new entrants. It would also largely dissolve the trade-off that we have 
identified above. For the short-term (i.e. the next 3 or so year) power prices will not be 
affected by investment in new capacity because of the limited capacity that can be created. 
5.  Experiences with the first round of allocation in the ETS have also shown the limits of using 
grandfathering as allocation methodology. These limits are shortcomings related to the base 
year that becomes increasingly remote, or if the base year is ‘updated’, it undermines 
incentives to reduce emissions here and now,
4 complexities for new entrant allocation as 
well as closure rules and distributional impacts. While the high degree of discretion for 
member states has increased complexity, administrative burdens and transaction costs, it 
also led to distortions to competition in the internal market. Industry has put pressure on 
governments not to hand out less allowances than other governments. This has heightened 
interest in benchmarking and auctioning as potentially simpler and fairer methods of 
allocation, and methods that do not look back but rather ahead. 
Competitiveness 
6.  Since the start of the ETS, many potential options to address competitiveness and power 
price issues have been discussed and reviewed. There is no ideal option to address 
implications. We have identified two different categories of measures: ‘alleviation’ and 
‘compensation’. Alleviation measures aim at changing the incentive structure and the 
functioning of the allowance market essentially through regulation. Attention is needed to 
                                                 
3 Proposal one aims at power prices in the shorter term while proposal two at longer-term investment. 
4 If allocations continue to be based on an ‘updated’ base year, installations have every incentive to emit 
as much as possible as this is likely to increase their future allowances. This is sometimes referred to as 
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ensure that such measures do not impede efficiency of the EU ETS, power or other markets. 
Compensation measures try to correct undesirable economic and social outcomes from the 
trading market. In principle they are executed through recycling of revenues, allocation or 
subsidies. They raise issues on the organisation of this compensation (i.e. allocation, raising 
and distribution of funds), notably, how to minimise government intervention. Measures 
from both categories may have unintended consequences. Options are discussed in greater 
detail in Appendix 1. 
Sector coverage  
7.  From a pure economic point of view, including transport in the ETS (i.e. subjecting it to a 
cap) would minimise the societal cost of obtaining a given climate target, dynamic effects 
such as carbon leakage not considered. However, such a move would have major 
distributional impacts. As we see already, linking sectors together in a common scheme 
creates complexity and distributional frictions. This underlines the importance of 
developing policies that strike an appropriate balance between reductions in the trading 
sector and possibly within transport and other non-trading sectors. Member states have 
given little attention so far to this.  
Emergence of a global carbon market  
8.  Linking of schemes is motivated by attempts to create a global carbon market. The case 
rests on the economic argument that a wider market reduces overall abatement costs, 
prevents distortions to international competition and increases liquidity. To date, it is 
difficult to provide an assessment of the feasibility of such linking as those schemes to 
which the ETS could be linked to, are in development only with yet uncertain design 
options. However a few tentative conclusions can be made. Linking of emissions trading 
schemes, even if they act as an obstacle to the development of widely divergent designs, 
does not run into fundamental problems, as long as technical fixes such as gateways or 
additional eligibility rules are put into place. However, such fixes generally reduce the 
efficiency through adding transaction costs, market fragmentation or through perverse 
effects or distortions. This is associated with a risk of increasing complexity up to a point 
where the economic efficiency of such schemes becomes questionable. The most critical 
issue for linking is distributional impacts as different participants would be affected in 
dissimilar ways. When two programmes are linked, the market price will be higher than the 
pre-link price in one of the trading schemes and lower than the pre-link price in the other 
zone, thereby creating winners and losers. This paper therefore has identified three possible 
options for an emerging global carbon market:  
a)  Linking of national or regional schemes: principal challenges are complexity, allocation 
and dealing with winners and losers; 
b)  Bottom-up carbon market based on market participants searching for arbitrage 
possibilities enabled by the existence of projects credits in all emission trading schemes. 
Environmental outcome is uncertain as dynamics are fuelled by economic concerns 
primarily.  
c)  Sector-wide international trading schemes would provide clearer market signals but 
pose many institutional, notably governance issues.  
III. Recommendations 
1.  The forthcoming EU ETS review should concentrate mainly on the following key issues to 
avoid diluting resources to lesser important issues: i) improving member state 
implementation to increase consistency and transparency, notably for allocation and ii) re-iv | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
assessing key design options, especially allocation methodologies, sector-coverage and 
investment incentives to make the ETS more compatible with long-term climate change 
targets and allow it cope with the post-2012 period.  
2.  The EU ETS review must be based on real empirical evidence such as member state 
verification reports, including ex-post evaluation if available.  
Investment incentives  
3.  As investment in new low-carbon technology will become increasingly dominant, the focus 
of the debate on investment incentives should first be on new entrants and closure rules 
followed by a more general consideration of allocation methodologies (i.e. benchmarking or 
auctioning). 
4.  Discussions on investment incentives should primarily focus on the power sector and 
possibly refining, where the main investment will take place.  
5.  If the aim is to provide incentives to low-carbon technologies, for the short-term (i.e. phase 
II), there should be no fuel-specific allocation to new entrants. Free allocation of power to 
new entrants should be limited, while closure rules should be harmonised across the EU and 
preclude immediate withdrawal of allocation upon closure of an installation in order to 
provide correct incentives for new investment.  
6.  For the long-term, all fuel-specific allocation must be abolished and free allocation phased 
out, provided negative effects on competitiveness and security of supply can be minimised. 
7.  The EU and its member states should de-link the discussions on allocation methodologies 
and setting the cap. As a minimum the EU and member states must agree on an allocation 
methodology for the period beyond 2012 while providing flexibility in setting the cap to 
adapt to international developments. 
Breakthrough technologies  
8.  As the EU ETS on its own will most likely not provide sufficient incentives for the 
development of new breakthrough technologies, the EU and member states should start 
exploring what additional measures are needed, notably including R&D. 
Allocation methodologies  
9.  The Review should first develop a set of criteria against which future allocation 
methodologies should be judged (e.g. environmental objectives, efficiency, investment 
incentives into low-carbon technologies, competitiveness effects or distributional impacts) 
to provide more clarity and transparency.  
10. Rules on new entrants, closures and new entrant reserves (if applicable) must be 
harmonised. Member states should review the two options discussed in this report for new 
entrants allocation (see item 4 of Key Messages).  
11. Particular attention should be paid to cross-border effects of NERs provision and the 
Review should consider the usefulness of EU-wide default rules if not EU-level NERs rules. 
Sector coverage  
12. Member states must pay more attention as to the optimal mix of policies between the 
trading and non-trading sectors as this has major consequences for total abatement costs as 
well as distributional impacts and by extension political acceptability (i.e. willingness to 
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13. The EU should develop criteria against which to judge sector-coverage: e.g. i) size of 
installation, i.e. emissions ii) numbers of installations, iii) accuracy and simplicity of 
monitoring, reporting and verification, iv) administration costs to governments and covered 
sources, v) expected abatement costs, vi) volume of and trends in emissions, vii) technical 
feasibility of reducing emissions, viii) competitiveness effects, ix) the feasibility of 
alternative policies and measures.  
14. Pre-determined criteria must be applied when evaluating the need to increase or reduce 
sectors or gases, for example in the case of aviation, other industrial sectors, treatment of 
small installations or domestic off-set projects. 
Competitiveness effects  
15. Any solution to the power price issue and possible competitiveness problems of some 
energy-intensive industries must carefully take into account possible unintended 
consequences (see also Annex 1 of this paper).  
Emerging of the global carbon market 
16. As the analysis of this paper suggests, at least three different ‘models’ of linking are 
possible
5 and the EU should equally support all options as at this moment is not yet clear 
whether any would be superior to the others. 
                                                 
5 Linking via international agreement (Art. 25), bottom-up approaches driven by market participants 
searching for arbitrage possibilities between different schemes, and sector approaches at international or 
global level. | 1 
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Report of the European Climate Platform (ECP) 
 
Christian Egenhofer, Noriko Fujiwara, Markus Åhman & Lars Zetterberg 
1. Introduction 
The European Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) is the flagship of EU climate change policy 
for political, environmental and economic reasons. Emissions trading is one of the crucial pillars 
upon which both the EU’s climate change policy and the (yet to emerge) global regime is 
expected to rest. It covers almost half of the EU CO2 emissions and more than a third of total 
greenhouse gas emissions. The ETS is the show case for applying the economic policy 
instrument of emissions trading in practice at large, cross-border scale for CO2 emissions. It has 
even been argued that the success of the ETS is crucial to convince other parts of the world to 
adopt binding commitments. The stakes are high and the forthcoming 2006 review offers a 
unique chance to address real shortcomings of the ETS and to make the ETS fit for the post-
2012 period. This paper addresses the principal strategic challenges that the EU ETS is facing 
and makes a number of concrete recommendations.  
2.  Status of the EU ETS and strategic challenges 
Even though the EU ETS will ultimately be judged on the basis of its effectiveness as a tool to 
reduce GHG emissions, the underlying rationale for choosing emissions trading was based on 
economic considerations. From the outset, those designing the EU ETS have attempted to 
internalise a market externality (i.e. CO2 emissions) with minimal impact on competitiveness. In 
theory, under the ETS, the market price of carbon is driven by the marginal abatement costs of 
all controlled sources, thereby ensuring that the environmental objective is achieved at the least 
cost. The resulting market price was expected to create long-term predictability, which is critical 
for spurring investment. In addition, the ETS should offer flexibility to management to choose 
the most cost-effective compliance strategy. The EU ETS has attempted to add extra flexibility 
and potentially low-cost abatement options by allowing credits from the Kyoto Protocol’s 
project mechanisms to be used for compliance via the Linking Directive. One of the principal 
challenges therefore has been getting the balance between supply and demand ‘right’. Recent 
developments suggest that the first period may have failed in this respect. This should not come 
as a surprise though, as i.e. allocation methodology and cap level has been determined 
somewhat arbitrarily, notably as result of allocations being based on emissions forecasts, which 
in many cases have turned out to be wrong. 
On the other hand, the EU ETS has been adopted in a very short period of time – reflecting the 
strong political will in the EU to meet its obligations under the Kyoto Protocol – but 
implementation is far from complete. In many respects, the EU ETS is still a construction site 
with many critical elements of the infrastructure still under creation.
6 A lack of infrastructure 
inhibits trading and efficient price-setting.  
                                                 
6 This includes for example, the late establishment of registries, late installation level allocations in some 
member states, the missing International Transaction Log – a precondition for trading of CDM credits – 
or the sometimes hesitant steps taken towards implementing the Linking Directive.  2 | EGENHOFER, FUJIWARA, ÅHMAN & ZETTERBERG 
 
While this infrastructure is progressively being put into place, the initial phase of the EU ETS 
has coincided with high energy prices, which in the context of imperfect energy markets 
generally has increased costs to enterprises. Beyond that, another important factor for the initial 
results of the EU ETS has been the increased spread between coal and gas prices, which has 
pushed up EU allowance prices. In the short term, fuel switching – from coal to gas – is the 
principal way to reduce CO2 emissions. However, the coal/gas spread increase has compelled 
power plants to burn more coal, which in return has made CO2 prices climb. In addition to 
shortcomings due to the lack of infrastructure, this has generally meant that it was mainly the 
power sector, which has been short due to allocation and the coal/gas spread that has engaged in 
the trading market. The industrial sector – generally long – has been less engaged. In addition, 
most active trading participants come from those member states with tighter allocation, and 
hence are buyers. On the other hand, market participants from those countries with less tight 
allocation, potential sellers from mainly but not only the new member states, have not yet 
engaged in trading as a result of a lack of infrastructure and in some cases, the absence of 
installation level allocation. In the absence of member state verification reports prior to mid-
May, the behaviour of market participants had to be guided by expectations rather than reliable 
information. Such a situation is not unusual in newly developing markets, and in some cases has 
led to ‘strange’ behaviour. This will however disappear with a more mature market. 
Uncertainty has prevailed because of doubts on the further development of the Kyoto Protocol 
project mechanisms, the timing of the International Transaction Log, international developments 
with effects on oil and gas markets, the relative illiquidity and the perceived high level of 
market power concentration in the EU ETS market but also the possibility of a prolonged legal 
battle on the UK claim for an addition of 20 MtCO2 to its NAP, the effects of future entry in the 
EU and the ETS of Bulgaria and Romania. The dramatic price collapse in late April has 
reflected this uncertainty. 
Against this background it is too early to pass (final) judgement on the EU ETS. Nevertheless, a 
number of issues have been identified by the literature and that will be discussed in the 
following sections: allocation including new entrants and closure rules, investment, economic 
impacts including power prices, sector coverage and the EU ETS in the global carbon market as 
strategic long-term questions.  
3.  Allocation: Lessons from phase I 
Now that the first round of allocation is almost completed, a number of concerns have been 
identified. An important concern is that of environmental targets, because most member states 
have allowed emissions from the covered sectors to rise in the period 2005-07, despite the fact 
that many must reduce their emissions to achieve their Kyoto Protocol targets. For example 
several member states have allowed their covered sectors to increase emissions by as much as 
10 or 20%, although they are on a trajectory that will not enable them to meet the Kyoto 
Protocol targets.
7 Initial draft verification reports of member states indicate that there has been 
significant overallocation in several member states and that the market as a whole is also long 
by approximately 2.5% during the first year of trading (i.e. companies received more allowances 
than needed). 
                                                 
7 Initial draft verification reports of member states indicate that there has been significant overallocation 
in several member states and that the market as a whole is also long by approximately 2.5% during the 
first year of trading i.e. companies received more allowances than needed.  THE EU EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME: TAKING STOCK AND LOOKING AHEAD | 3 
 
Other concerns relate to the high degree of decentralisation – a deliberate member state choice – 
with a considerable amount of member state discretion in the allocation process (i.e. NAP-
related issues), which has been a deliberate policy choice by the EU. This, however, has led to 
inconsistencies between member states, which could distort competition, diminish the efficiency 
of the market and ultimately, undermine environmental effectiveness and the trust placed in the 
system. Some have been addressed by the updated Guidance document on allocation, published 
in late 2005 (European Commission, 2005a).  
The following broad experiences can be mentioned:  
•  Allocation levels: Allocations have often been based on projections of future need. In most 
member states, allocations have exceeded historic emissions. Inflated baselines were a 
striking feature of the first round of allocation plans, resulting in substantial over-allocation 
for industries in some countries (LETS Update 2006: 6-7). Generally, governments engaged 
in close dialogue with the industry prior to the allocation, and the national governments 
could do little else but give in to pressures from their own industry. Since the submission of 
extra allowances did not have any immediate cost to member states, the rules opened up a 
classic free-rider situation. For energy-intensive industries, allocation was a means to 
compensate them for ETS-related costs. The situation is, however, different for phase II, 
which coincides with the Kyoto Protocol commitment period. For phase II, many member 
states will either have to decrease the allocation considerably, reduce emissions in the non-
trading sectors or buy shortages through CDM and JI (Zetterberg et al., 2004). 
•  High degree of decentralisation makes member states vulnerable to industry pressure. 
While the considerable discretion of member states when undertaking allocation has helped 
to accommodate national differences, at the same time it has submitted member states to 
considerable pressure from industry not to provide less allowances than other governments.  
•  Shortages are in the energy sector: When allocation is reduced in relation to projections 
or current emissions this is often done in the power or energy sector. In Sweden the 
allocation to energy installations is 80% of emissions reported in 1998-2001. Similar 
reductions are done in the UK, Denmark and Austria. The reason for this is that the energy 
sector is assumed to have the lowest costs of abatement – at least in member states with 
liberalised energy markets – also has the possibility to pass through the extra costs 
associated with allowances to the clients. But there are member states that have not 
followed this. In Finland and Lithuania the energy sector has received more allowances than 
current emissions (Zetterberg et al., 2004).  
•  Considerable interest in benchmarking: As the first phase allocation plans were 
developed there was considerable support for using benchmarking, both among 
governments and industry. The main arguments being that benchmarking rewards CO2-
efficiency, it is seen as a driver towards more CO2-efficient processes and it is perceived as 
fair. This support is currently still high in industry. Consequently, governments in several 
member states, for instance in the Netherlands, Germany, the UK and to some extent 
Sweden, have invested considerable effort in investigating alternative allocation 
methodologies. However, experiences to date have shown that benchmarking is often 
associated with problems concerning data retrieval and the definition of product groups (e.g. 
Radov, Harrison & Klevnas, 2005; Zetterberg & Åhman, 2005). 
•  Allocation involves high values. The value of allocation is important. In the energy sector, 
the value of allocation to new entrants lies between 18% and 27% of expected revenues in 
Denmark, Finland, Germany and the Baltic member states. Compared to fixed costs of new 
capacity, the value of allocation lies between 70 %-105 % in these member states (Åhman 4 | EGENHOFER, FUJIWARA, ÅHMAN & ZETTERBERG 
 
& Holmgren, 2006). Values are however sensitive to the relationship between actual fuel 
and CO2 prices at a certain moment.  
•  New entrant allocation rules distort competition. Each member state has developed rules 
for allocation to new entrants and these rules vary considerably between member states. A 
new natural gas CHP plant would in Germany receive allowances corresponding to 130% of 
its expected emissions. The corresponding figures are 120% for Finland, 90% for Denmark 
and 60% for Sweden. For a new natural gas combined cycle electricity production unit (no 
heat) the differences are even larger. In Germany the installation would receive 105% of the 
required allowances. In Finland 100 %, in Denmark 82 %, and in Sweden 0% (Sweden does 
not give allowances for non-CHP). Since the differences in allocation are associated with 
large values, current allocation rules have an impact on investment decisions, and can 
significantly distort competition if they remain unchanged (Åhman & Holmgren, 2006).  
•  Distinction of new entrants from capacity expansion has been difficult. Generally, 
governments have struggled to distinguish between new entrants (i.e. new capacity) and 
capacity expansion (see Åhman & Zetterberg, 2003), primarily in the industry sector. In the 
power sector, such a distinction was easier as new capacity in the power sector typically 
consists of individual boilers.  
•  Closures rules create perverse incentives. Most member states apply closure rules stating 
that if an installation is closed or if production is reduced significantly the amount of 
allocation corresponding to the reduction of economic activity will be withdrawn. The rule 
may seem logical, since the company will not need all allowances. But the problem is that it 
reduces considerably the incentives for clean technology that the ETS was intended to 
create (Åhman et al., 2005). Withdrawing allocation upon closure amounts to introducing an 
incentive to continue (an inefficient) operation in order to keep allowances. In the opposite 
case, allowing an installation to keep allowances after closure creates an incentive to close 
inefficient installations as the installation can keep allowances and use the corresponding 
revenue to invest in new installations. Transfer rules whereby allowances from closed 
installations could be used for new installations have tried to overcome this problem but 
have increased complexity and risk creating distortions. 
•  The setting up and management of new entrants’ reserves increases complexity and 
risks distortions. Most member states have created a new entrants reserve (NER) to be 
allocated for free to new entrants. The governments must decide on how to allocate, for 
example on the basis of expected emissions (since new entrants will have no historic 
emissions base) or based on benchmarks and projected production. Member states must also 
decide what to do if more new entrants appear once the set-aside fund has been used up and 
conversely, what use will be made of any allowances that are left in the reserve at the end of 
the period.  
3.1  New entrants (i.e. new capacity) allocation  
As the 2004 Guidance document on allocation states (p. 12), “the treatment of new entrants, i.e. 
installations starting operation in the course of a trading period, is one of the most important 
design choices in any emissions trading scheme” (European Commission 2004) because it 
affects firms’ compliance strategies. Theory suggests that new installations should be forced to 
buy allowances rather than be given for free. 
In the short-term and in an operational sense, economic incentives with regard to production 
and/or trading decisions are the same regardless of whether a new installation is given 
allowances for free or not. Decisions are based on cost considerations including opportunity THE EU EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME: TAKING STOCK AND LOOKING AHEAD | 5 
 
costs and ultimately depend on pass-through capacity of the cost of CO2. Strategically, i.e. with 
regard to investment decisions, allocation methods matter however. The fundamental reason 
why new installations should buy their allowances – rather than get them for free – is that 
auctioning provides the best incentives for investments in new, less carbon intensive 
technologies. A further argument for auctioning is that new installations do not carry the cost of 
previous investment, which was made when there was no carbon constraint (i.e. sunk costs).
8 
The most commonly voiced arguments in favour of free allocation to new entrants run along the 
following lines (for an overview and further details, see Egenhofer & Fujiwara, 2005 and 2006): 
1.  Existing installations are overcompensated through grandfathering, which may justify an 
equal subsidy to new installations.  
2.  Existing installations are encouraged to continue operating since allowances are withdrawn 
if they close. This puts new installations at a disadvantage. Thus the justification for free 
allowances to new entrants becomes easier under current closure rules than if closed 
installations can keep their allowances. 
3.  Since firms typically are constrained by capital, and capital markets are not perfect, there 
could be reason to subsidise capital by allocating free allowances in order to reduce the 
investment barrier. 
4.  Perceived fairness; if existing installations get free allowances, why should new 
installations not also get them, especially as they carry a price risk? If new entrants are not 
granted allowances on the same basis as existing market participants, price risk, particularly 
in an illiquid market would put them at greater disadvantage. This is heightened by the fact 
that a new entrant entering the market is most likely to buy allowances from its incumbent 
competitor. 
5.  It is argued that free allocation will help to contribute to limiting wholesale power prices 
and to minimise windfall profits. This is likely to be the case in the long run and if 
allocation is based on benchmarks. For the short-term (i.e. the next 3 year or so) power 
prices will not be affected by investment in new capacity as it will be too small. If free 
allocation is to be used, the strongest incentives for low carbon technologies are created by 
the use of fuel- and technology neutral benchmarks.  
There is no doubt that new entrants are crucial to both the deployment of new and more efficient 
technology, a key objective of climate change policy and attempts to reduce power prices. 
Current allocation rules, notably rules on new entrants and closures provide incentives keep 
inefficient plants in operation, maintain an upward pressure on power prices as it would keep 
high costs producers (as marginal generator) in the market. Market power concentration and 
inefficient power markets in many EU member states reinforce this tendency.  
On the other hand, the first round of allocation has shown that special provisions for new 
entrants is a political priority in all member states and is likely to remain so in the second phase. 
It is therefore realistic to propose that member states continue to allow (but not require) new 
entrant reserves. However, to avoid competitive distortions between member states, a 
standardised approach across member states is needed.  
Ultimately, three proposals have emerged on the interface of new entrants-power prices-
investments.  
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Proposal  1 is to auction for new entrants but this may delay  the investment as it puts new 
investment at a relative disadvantage to incumbents, especially as they are overcompensated by 
free allocation. This proposal gives clear signals for low carbon investment. Power prices may 
remain high as the marginal plant – although more efficient – needs to buy all allowances. There 
is little political support for this option as long as the other industrial regions are not part of a 
global scheme. 
Proposal 2 is to give new entrants allowances for free from a dedicated reserve. The resulting 
effectiveness depends now on the details of this free allocation. Current practice of some 
member states to grant as many allowances or even more than are needed provides little 
incentives to reduce emissions.  
As the two options aim at different objectives
9 they constitute a trade-off. 
A third proposal is to treat new entrants and incumbents alike, i.e. the same degree of free 
allocation and auctioning. Proponents argue that this provides stronger signals towards low-
carbon investment and thereby could have a positive effect on power prices while ensuring 
equal treatment of incumbents and new entrants. It would also largely dissolve the trade-off that 
we have identified above.  
3.2  Closure rules  
The issue of closure rules (i.e. what happens if an installation that has received allowances 
ceases to operate) is closely linked to that of rules for new entrants. To obtain a level playing 
field between incumbents and new entrants the interaction between rules on closures and new 
entrants should be given more consideration (see Åhman et al., 2005).  
Theory suggests that allowances in case of closure should not be removed as this keeps correct 
incentives to close inefficient installations. As more efficient new entrants will replace these 
installations, emissions would go down (see also Åhman et al., 2005). Conversely, withdrawing 
allocation upon closure equals introducing an incentive to continue (an inefficient) operation. 
Since the number of allowances that would be lost upon closures is greater for inefficient 
installations – assuming they have been allocated a greater number of allowances per unit of 
production than more efficient installations – the effects of such a closure rule can in fact be 
significant.  
In practice, only two member states, i.e. the Netherlands and Sweden ‘follow’ the theory and 
allow for keeping of allowances in case of closures. As this extends only to the end of the first 
period, the incentive effect is likely to be small, however. In some cases member states 
deliberately chose to seize allowances in case of closure to keep power plants running for 
reasons of security of supply.  
Some member states (e.g. Germany, Italy, Austria and Poland) have introduced transfer rules, 
saying that in case of new investment operators should be allowed to ‘transfer’ allowances to 
new installation. This has a similar incentive effect as allowing installations to keep allowances 
when closing, but increases the complexity of the system. Further, such a system favours new 
investments made by incumbent companies over ‘true’ new entrants to the market (see Bode et 
al., 2005; Åhman et al., 2005), which can increase market power concentration in EU electricity 
markets. 
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3.3 Allocation  methodologies:  The limits of grandfathering 
Experience with the first round of allocation in the ETS has shown the limits of using 
grandfathering as an allocation methodology. In addition to the complexities related to new 
entrant allocation as well as closure rules, they have raised distributional issues and miss to 
provide adequate investment incentives.  
In addition, the high degree of discretion for member states has increased complexity, 
administrative burdens and transaction costs while leading to distortions to competition in the 
internal market. Industry has put pressure on governments not to hand out fewer allowances 
than other governments (e.g. Zetterberg et al., 2004; Matthes et al. 2005; 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2005).  
As the EU ETS moves forward, basing allocation on performance before 2005 will become 
increasingly less relevant and harder to justify. On the other hand, if allocation is based on 
events from 2005 or after, this introduces incentives to the firms to adjust operations in order to 
influence allocation and maximise profits, i.e. updating. Somehow updating cannot be avoided 
as the original base year becomes increasingly remote and meaningless. If allocation is to be 
updated, auctioning would create the greatest incentives for carbon efficiency, followed by 
(fuel-neutral) benchmarking. Grandfathering (emission-based allocation) would create the 
lowest incentives for abatement (Zetterberg, 2006). For grandfathering, however, the abatement 
incentives can be increased considerably if the base years are chosen with a significant time lag, 
i.e. ten years earlier (Åhman et al., 2006).  
It is hard to perceive that EU industry would accept auctioning in the absence of a global 
climate change regime that imposes comparable carbon constraints to all its competitors. As a 
consequence, there has been increasing interest in benchmarking (e.g. Radov, Harrison & 
Klevna 2005; Zetterberg & Åhman, 2005; Schyns, 2005), another free approach to allocation. 
3.3.1 Benchmarks 
A benchmark system could be defined as neutral or specific with regard to fuel, technology 
and/or product. For example, a fuel-neutral benchmark would give an equal number of 
allowances per generated MWh, regardless of what fuel is used. Fuel-specific benchmarks 
would instead give a different number of allowances per MWh, depending on what fuel is used. 
The benchmark
10 would serve as guide to allocate allowances on some sort of ‘fair’ criteria. As 
allocation is linked to performance, benchmarking rewards CO2-efficiency including low carbon 
investment and early action. Hence, benchmarking is principally regarded as a means to address 
fairness and investment.
11 Most importantly using benchmarks for allocation to both existing 
and new installations would reduce the perverse incentives introduced by adjustments of 
allocation to closures and new entrants. Nevertheless, while benchmarking might be appropriate 
to set efficiency criteria concerning the allocation of emissions rights, the question of fixing the 
activity level for each installation is an open and difficult one. The Swedish benchmarking 
experience has shown difficulties with data availability and generally complexity, such as 
setting boundaries of output or how to measure it. In some sectors such as steel, it appears to be 
very difficult to set a benchmark for an integrated mill due to the complexity of the production 
processes but also different legal operators. The alternative, a theoretical benchmark would be 
more practical but would have the disadvantage not fully reflecting the situation in each 
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individual installation. Although over time, in line with the Sevilla process to develop indicators 
for BAT (best-available technology) it should be thinkable to move towards benchmarks.  
Benchmarks have been used by some member states in their phase I NAPs. Some (e.g. 
Germany, Denmark and Finland) have utilised benchmarks for allocation to new entrants, and 
others (e.g. Sweden, Netherlands, Italy) for installations in general and/or fixed energy 
efficiency rates for energy production installations. While such approaches are covered by the 
EU ETS Directive, the problem is that the metrics differ between member states. For instance, 
some member states base allocation on installed capacity and projected utilisation rates, some 
on projected output and others on best-available technology. Hence, better coordination across 
member states to work towards EU-wide benchmarks could be an important first step towards 
progress on benchmarking. EU-wide benchmarks instead of national ones are necessary to avoid 
fragmentation in the EU internal market.  
The next question is whether to apply fuel-specific or fuel-neutral benchmarks. It is without 
doubt that fuel- and technology-neutral benchmarks provide the strongest incentives for low 
carbon technologies. Fuel-specific benchmarks will only drive efficiency for each fuel and 
technology but not necessarily lead to switching to low-carbon fuels and technologies. On the 
other hand, fuel-neutral benchmarks are likely to affect security of supply by for example 
further increasing gas import dependency. There would be very big differences between 
member states as to security of supply concerns. In addition, fuel neutral benchmarking creates 
winners and losers. They will lead to an allocation that is either considerably lower (e.g. in the 
case of coal) or that is considerably higher (e.g. in the case of natural gas) than actual emissions. 
As the NAP phase I has shown, such a situation is likely to increase pressure on government 
from potential losers. In order to reach acceptance for the NAPs, many governments have been 
hesitant to deviate from status quo, i.e. current emissions. We can also note that in those cases 
where benchmarks were applied, notably for new entrants, usually fuel specific benchmarks 
were used. 
3.3.2 Auctioning 
Auctioning is allowed in the EU ETS, to a limited extent. Five per cent of the total quantity 
allocated in each country may be auctioned for the first phase of the scheme, and 10% for the 
second phase. While only Denmark, Hungary, Ireland and Lithuania will use auctioning in NAP 
phase I, several member states have indicated to make more extensive use of auctioning in NAP 
phase II.
12 The main issues related to auctioning is likely to be the impact on costs and resulting 
effects on competitiveness (i.e. profits) for the energy-intensive industries, whose competitors 
are not subject to a similar carbon constraint, a ‘secondary allocation’ debate on how to recycle 
revenues as well as open questions on the mechanics of auctioning, notably to avoid that market 
dominance is enhanced (i.e. ‘deep pocket’ issues). Finally, the effects on auctioning in different 
member states would be very different depending on the structure of the power sector, i.e. 
whether coal or nuclear/hydro based. Member states will therefore be subject to pressure by 
their industries.  
4.  Economic impacts (including power price increases) 
The potential economic impact of the ETS can either stem from the need to cover process 
emissions, i.e. emissions in excess of those covered by ‘free allocation’ or the fact that it covers 
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combustion emissions, which – regardless the allocation method – leads to power price 
increases. The actual impact on each sector or installation then depends on: i) a sector’s ability 
to pass through costs in different product markets and ii) the structure of national or regional 
power markets.  
Several studies (e.g. IEA, 2005a; Demailly & Quirion, 2005; Carbon Trust, 2004; Quirion, 
2003) tend to confirm that the EU ETS could lead to market share losses and, as a result, to 
carbon leakage, especially if the indirect effects owing to the inclusion of carbon in the power 
price are realised. Potential losses in market share, however, depend on the extent to which EU 
producers can pass on the extra cost to consumers and suppliers. A second element is how 
quickly non-EU producers can increase their production in the short-term. Therefore it is most 
likely that negative effects on competitiveness do not fully come into play in the immediate 
short-term. This is even truer as long as investors assume that over a reasonable period other 
countries will gradually become subject to carbon constraints. The one notable exception to the 
general finding is aluminium, where studies agree that it is directly affected in its net value as a 
result of the fact that the sector cannot pass on price increases, as product prices are set by 
international commodity markets (e.g. Carbon Trust, 2004; IEA, 2005a). According to the 
aluminium industry, the power price constitutes more than 25% of the total production costs of 
primary aluminium. As primary aluminium is a globally traded commodity, its price is set by 
the world market and the European aluminium industry has no opportunity to pass on the 
increased costs. Preliminary conclusions from a study of McKinsey (forthcoming) indicate that 
a price of €25/t CO2 will lead to a 14% cost increase for primary aluminium production. An 
internal analysis by Hydro (Nord, 2005) shows an even greater increase. The aluminium 
industry reckons that this would represent an average 10% of the selling price of metal at 
today’s prices (Stevens, 2005).  
Under a €10 per tonne of CO2 scenario by the IEA (2005a) study, basic oxygen furnace steel, 
cement and aluminium would already incur reductions in profit margins of between 6-8% of 
total profits. Contrary to the IEA study, the Carbon Trust (2004) concluded that at a price of €10 
per tonne of CO2, only aluminium would be directly affected in its net value. At a price of €25 
per tonne of CO2, however, Carbon Trust (2004) estimated that aluminium, cement and steel 
would need to be able to pass on significant price increases in order to maintain their market 
share. The figures are 31.4% for aluminium, 7.3% for steel and 17.4% for cement. Although 
there is major controversy on the ability of pass-through of sectors, it is hard to imagine that 
industries are able to pass-through cost increases in that magnitude.  
Neither of the studies has examined the specific effects that occur due to geographical proximity 
of non-EU competitors for example in the Mediterranean in cement or refining. For some 
industries the competitive disadvantage is related to the geographical proximity of their 
competitors’ particular installations.  
Power prices are influenced by many factors, of which the EU ETS is but one. In general it is 
difficult to assess the impact of CO2 allowance prices, as these are determined by a large variety 
of factors, including fuel prices, available generation capacity, euro/dollar exchange rates, 
investment costs, power imports, weather conditions, heat demand (‘must runs’), the flexibility 
of gas contracts as well as market expectations and more. Even the extent to which CO2 prices 
are passed through to power prices varies by market, load factor and the power market in 
question (see Sijm et al., 2005; Sijm et al., 2006).  
The objective of the EU ETS was to include the CO2 price in the marginal costs of power. While 
the ETS is likely to push up power prices, it may at the same time reduce coal prices. It must 
also be noted that the EU ETS was launched at a time of very high energy prices, which has 
influenced power prices. In addition, high gas prices make power plants continue to burn more 
coal and push up EU allowance prices. This is coupled with the fact that current allocation rules 10 | EGENHOFER, FUJIWARA, ÅHMAN & ZETTERBERG 
 
provide for disincentives to close inefficient plants, and allow for potential windfall profits for 
the power sector. There are two different causes of windfall profits. The first category is due to 
the fact that generators pass on CO2 costs for which they have not actually paid as a result of 
free allocation. The second is that low carbon generators benefit from ETS-induced increases in 
power prices. The latter category is unavoidable as putting a price on carbon makes low carbon 
generators more competitive. 
Are there options to address competitiveness issues? 
Since the start of the ETS, a number of potential options to address the issues have been 
discussed. They are reviewed by Sijm et al. (2005) and Harrison & Radov (2005) and tested on 
their political suitability for example by CEPS (Egenhofer & Fujiwara, 2005 and 2006). There 
seems no ideal option to address implications. 
As follows, CEPS has identified two different categories of measures: ‘alleviation’ and 
‘compensation’. Alleviation measures aim at changing the incentive structure and the 
functioning of the allowance market essentially through regulation. Attention is needed to 
ensure that such measures do not impede efficiency of the EU ETS, power or other markets. 
Compensation measures try to correct undesirable economic and social outcomes from the 
trading market. In principle they are executed through recycling of revenues, allocation or 
subsidies. They raise issues on the organisation of this compensation (i.e. allocation, raising and 
distribution of funds), notably, how to minimise government intervention. Measures from both 
categories may have unintended consequences. Some options are discussed in greater detail in 
Appendix 1. 
5.  Sector and gas coverage 
The EU ETS originally had limited the trading sector to six sectors: energy production, iron and 
steel, cement, glass, ceramics, and paper and pulp. This coverage was meant to strike a 
reasonable balance between creating a sufficiently large market and remaining practical and 
simple to minimise transaction costs. Hence there were implicit criteria for sector coverage.  
More recently, there have been calls for including aviation (European Commission, 2005b), 
transport more generally as well as for exploring the opportunities for opting-in additional gases 
or domestic off-set projects. The fundamental argument for bringing more sources under the EU 
ETS lies in the opportunities to increase the options for emission reductions within the ETS and 
hereby lower the total costs for reaching climate targets but also bring new sources under the 
cap. Additional gases increase the variety of reduction options, offer additional innovation 
potentials if innovation lead times are respected and increase liquidity and ultimately the 
efficiency of the market. Precondition are however effective monitoring and that inclusion 
achieves real reductions, for example beyond business-as-usual. According to Capros et al. 
(2000), a ‘6-gas strategy’ approach for the EU ETS could decrease the allowance price by more 
than a third from the CO2 only price level. According to this estimate, the EU ETS allowance 
price for one tonne of CO2  equivalent could be reduced from €33/tCO2 with CO2  only to 
€20/tCO2 with six gases only to reach the EU’s Kyoto target, i.e. 8% reduction in GHG 
emissions. Although estimates about efficiency gains remain controversial for example 
depending on the translation of Global Warming Potentials (GWP) (e.g. Aaheim et al., 2004), 
there is an acknowledgment that multi-gas trading is generally more efficient, i.e. it reduces 
compliance costs (e.g. Hyman et al., 2002; Kets, 2002). On the other hand, additional gases can 
increase the complexity and increase transaction costs or lead to mitigation of distributional 
impacts. Hence, policy makers may face a trade-off between overall efficiency on the one hand 
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of including more sectors into the EU trading system from an economic and equity point of 
view. 
5.1  Transport (in general and aviation) 
Both the European Commission and the Council of the EU have expressed their interests in 
analysing whether air transport emissions could be included into the EU ETS. The last six 
months the discussions have focused on design elements of how aviation can be included in the 
system. These elements include coverage of non-CO2 effects of aviation such as condensation 
trails, geographical coverage, trading entities, allocation responsibility, allocation methodology 
and interaction with the Kyoto protocol. These elements have been analysed in detail in CE et 
al. (2005). CE Delft (2006) and Sweden’s FlexMex2 commission (SOU, 2005) have also 
performed introductory studies on the feasibility of including road transport and shipping into 
the EU ETS in a longer time perspective.  
When discussing options for introducing transport under a cap and trade programme, the leading 
issue appears to be whether transport should lie under the same cap as the current trading 
industries or whether transport should lie under its own dedicated cap. The transport sector 
differs from the industrial sector in two important ways: firstly, the sector is expanding at a fast 
rate and secondly, the willingness to pay for carbon emissions in general
13 is expected to be 
much larger in the transport sector than in the industrial sectors. These facts have significant 
implications on the consequences from having one common cap or two separate caps.  
From a pure economic point of view, putting transport under the same cap would minimise the 
society costs of meeting a given climate target, given dynamic effects not considered. Since the 
transport sector is important as an emission source the introduction of this sector in the EU ETS 
is attractive. But given the growth rate and the willingness to pay, we would expect a dramatic 
increase in the demand for allowances from transport under the same cap as the current trading 
industry. This would increase the price of allowances and probably that of electricity, and 
increase the risk for relocation of EU industries to outside the EU.  
One alternative solution would be to have two caps; one cap for the current trading industries 
and one separate cap for transport with both having separate allocations. By having separate 
caps one could isolate the sectors from each other and define separate emission targets for each 
sector. Having separate caps would thus ‘protect’ the current trading industries from price 
increases due to increased demand from transport. The allowance prices would be different in 
the different caps, which indicates that the costs for emission reductions are different in the 
different sectors. Total costs for society would be higher compared to implementing a common 
cap. The distribution of costs on different actors is also very different if we have two separate 
caps compared to one common cap. This might however only remain theoretically possible. If 
both the current ETS and the transport sector have access to the CER/ERU market, the two 
sectors act like communicating tubes. A strict cap for the aviation sector would result in high 
demand for CER/ERU and contribute to an increase of allowance prices in the EU ETS. 
The insights from this example of separate caps can be generalised. With the burden sharing 
agreement as an overall constraint, setting a cap for the trading sector implicitly sets an emission 
target or ‘cap’ for the non-trading sectors. The choice of sector coverage and size of the trading 
sector cap in relation to the implicit emission target in the non-trading sectors will have direct 
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implications on the society’s total costs for reaching the climate target, and also significant 
implications on how these costs are distributed between sectors. If we place the divider between 
the trading sector cap and the non-trading sector emission target will have implications on the 
total costs for reaching a climate target (economic efficiency) and considerable implications for 
the distribution of these costs between sectors (equity). This shows how important it is to 
develop policies that strike an appropriate balance between reductions from the trading sector, 
transport and other non-trading sectors. Ironically, this issue has received little attention so far.  
Some argue that the growth of the transport sector needs to be limited and that therefore it is 
inappropriate to have transport under the same cap as industry. The advocates of this argument 
see the sector (growth) target as more important than the climate target. The debate is interesting 
because it puts a finger on something important that lies at a higher political level than climate 
policy. When discussing the role of different sectors in reaching climate targets, what do we 
want the targets to achieve? Is it economic efficiency in reaching climate targets? Or is the 
target to reach a balance between different sectors that we believe to be optimal for the 
development of the society? Or is it to find solutions that are politically acceptable? If so, it is 
relevant to ask if a climate policy instrument such as the ETS is the best instrument for this. 
5.2 Criteria  for  sector-coverage 
To date there are no explicit criteria against which to judge sector coverage. There is however 
an implicit criterion to keep the system as simple as possible. On the other hand, there may be 
economic and environmental reasons to expand the ETS. To ground the political discussion in a 
more rational context, it would be helpful if the ETS review were to provide a set of criteria 
against which possible enlargement could be judged. Possible criteria are: i) size of installation, 
ii) numbers of installations, iii) accuracy and simplicity of monitoring, reporting and 
verification, iv) administration costs to governments and covered sources, v) expected 
abatement costs, vi) volume of and trends in emissions, vii) technical feasibility of reducing 
emissions, viii) competitiveness effects, ix) the feasibility of alternative policies and measures 
(see also LETS Update, 2006).  
Such criteria could be applied to all sources or installations and could therefore become the 
basis upon which to decide on whether to include or exclude a particular source, sector or 
installation, how to deal with small installations, domestic off-set projects or new sectors and 
gases.  
6.  Issues for an emerging global carbon market  
As in the case of sector coverage (section 5 above), the case rests on the economic case that a 
wider market – here through linking of markets – reduces overall abatement costs, prevents 
distortions to international competition and increases liquidity. Article 25 of the ETS Directive 
foresees the linking of the ETS with other national or regional emissions trading schemes via an 
international agreement. This reckons that the development of emission markets could become a 
possible pillar of the architecture in the post-2012 regime. To date, it is difficult to provide an 
assessment of the feasibility of such linking as those schemes to which the ETS could be linked 
to are still in development, with yet uncertain design options.  
Against this background, only a few tentative conclusions can be made. Linking of emissions 
trading schemes even if they inhibit widely divergent designs such as those on banking rules, 
coverage of sectors and gases or opt-ins/opt-outs does not run into fundamental problems, as 
long as technical fixes are put into place (Blyth & Bosi, 2004; Haites & Mullins, 2001; Baron & 
Bygrave, 2002; Haites, 2003). However, such fixes generally reduce the efficiency through 
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Linking of schemes will most likely require considerable adjustments of existing domestic and 
regional emissions trading schemes beforehand. This is associated with a risk of increasing 
complexity up to a point where the economic efficiency of such schemes becomes questionable. 
Critical issues for linking are allocation, monitoring, reporting and verification and issues of 
global governance (Egenhofer & Fujiwara, 2006).  
The most critical issue for linking is distributional impacts as different participants would be 
affected in dissimilar ways. When two programmes are linked, the market price will be higher 
than the pre-link price in one of the trading schemes and lower than the pre-link price in the 
other zone, thereby creating winners and losers. Winners will be net sellers in the low price 
scheme as the price goes up for them and net buyers in the high price scheme as prices go down 
for them. The reverse is true for net buyers in the low price scheme and net sellers in the high 
price scheme (Haites, 2003; Bode, 2003). The same holds true for expansion of the scheme. As 
a result, even though linking or expansion can yield an economic benefit, certain participants in 
the trading scheme will be worse off. Thus, extra incentives will be needed for potential losers.  
Given the possible obstacles from a political, economic and implementation point of view, let 
alone the fact that there is little to link to at least at the moment, a better option for a global 
carbon market to emerge may well be market participants searching for arbitrage possibilities 
between different carbon commodities. Such arbitrage is already happening as most national or 
regional climate change strategies foresee the use of project type of mechanisms either in the 
form of the Kyoto Protocol projects mechanisms (CDM/JI) or similar domestic projects such as 
those in the US or Australia. As long as domestic or regional emissions trading schemes allow 
for the use of credits from projects as the ETS does through the Linking Directive, the 
possibility of arbitrage is ensured.  
The third option for an emerging global carbon market would be to move towards sectoral 
agreement on an international scale (e.g. IEA, 2005b) as opposed to linking domestic schemes 
that include a variety of sectors. This would have the benefits of combining similar sectors or 
‘carbon commodities’ (Colombier & Kieken, 2006) with similar characteristics. This would 
greatly reduce the winner/loser conundrum while facilitating to provide an efficient price signal. 
There are however many open questions on institutional matters notably enforcement at global 
level.  
In conclusion, we can formulate three possible options for an emerging global carbon market:  
1)  Linking of national or regional schemes: principal challenges are complexity, allocation and 
dealing with winners and losers; 
2)  Bottom-up carbon market based on market participants searching for arbitrage possibilities 
enabled by the existence of project-based credits in all emission trading schemes. 
Environmental outcome is uncertain as dynamics is fuelled by economic concerns 
primarily; speed is also uncertain. 
3)  Sector-wide international trading schemes would provide clearer market signals but pose 
many institutional, notably governance issues, notably monitoring and enforcement at the 
global level.  
7.  Does the EU ETS promote the development of low carbon 
technologies?  
In the long-term, a critical element for meeting the climate change challenge will be the 
development and diffusion of new breakthrough technologies. Ultimately, any climate strategy 
will have to be measured against its capacity to foster first the development and then investment 
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One of the main criticisms with regard to the EU ETS has been that it discourages rather than 
encourages investment in new and low-carbon technologies in the long-term. To an extent this 
is result of international indecision, which in return reduces predictability. Some of the causes 
however are closer to home. They include short-term allocation periods and allocation 
methodologies, notably including new entrants and closure rules. In addition, fuel-specific 
allocation may have negative effects on investment in a carbon perspective as they do not 
discriminate necessarily between high and low-carbon fuels.  
A second, less prominent but more fundamental issue of the ETS is that by itself the ETS will 
not be capable to provide sufficient incentives to develop and bring to the market new 
breakthrough technologies, i.e. make R&D at massive scale profitable. Price signals need to be 
much higher and more credible in the long-term to generate a significant amount of private 
resources for R&D. 
As to the first criticism, the fear is that uncertainty stemming from the ETS will reduce 
investment incentives (see e.g. IEA, 2003; Matthes et al., 2005). The argument is that the EU 
ETS adds to investment uncertainty notably through short-term allocation periods. Current 
allocation periods provide certainty for only three, and then five years – periods that are far 
shorter than those associated with investment cycles. Other uncertainty stems from possibly 
perverse effects from new allocation methodologies, notably new entrants and closure rules or 
the possible depletion of NERs. Finally, a major part of uncertainty stems from the dynamics of 
international negotiations that notoriously are unpredictable.  
Uncertainty however is a normal factor for many investment decisions. Uncertainty relates to 
demand, electricity and other product prices, factor prices (primary energy, feedstock, labour, 
transport etc.), technological progress, competitors’ strategies as well as regulatory risks, which 
is the category the ETS falls into. Although there is nothing the EU can do to alleviate 
uncertainty stemming from the indecisiveness of international negotiations, the EU ETS Review 
should reassess the ETS impacts on investment certainty. The area to start with is new entrants 
and closure rules as well as allocation in general (see section 3 above). In addition, a number of 
additional options have been identified,
14 which the EU ETS 2006/7review could assess. Critical 
precondition is however that efficiency indicators at installation level are in line with long-term 
climate change targets and that such indicators are locked in long-term rules of allocation 
methodologies. Particular attention should be paid to the power sector as the principal 
investment relevant to climate change will be there. A more complete analysis is provided in 
Annex 2 of this report. 
As to the second criticism that the EU ETS will induce technological change of the magnitude 
that is required (e.g. Montgomery, 2005) it would be unrealistic to expect the ETS to do that at 
least in the short and medium term. Current policies including the ETS with a CO2 price below 
€30 do not make R&D profitable hence do not contribute to the development on new and 
breakthrough technologies. In addition, emissions trading schemes – as well as taxes – face 
credibility problems with investors. Price signals from the ETS essentially stem from 
government policy (i.e. how caps are set). This strong government role undermines the 
credibility of the long-term signal to an extent. Finally, in the ‘real world’ prices do not always 
provide the right signals as the different sectors (e.g. power, carbon-intensive industries, other 
industry, residential sectors or transport), representing different carbon commodities react 
                                                 
14 i) longer allocation periods, ii) new entrants’ and closure rules, iii) benchmarks, iv) long-term 
efficiency targets; v) relative targets for the industrial sector, vi) auctioning, vii) change of allocation 
methodologies, viii) long-term indicative targets for the EU, ix) ceiling on the allowance price (i.e. price 
caps); for details see e.g. Egenhofer et al. (2006). THE EU EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME: TAKING STOCK AND LOOKING AHEAD | 15 
 
differently. EU governments indeed struggle in combining an ‘affordable price’ to reduce 
competitiveness effects with ‘appropriate investment signals’ (see Colombier & Kieken, 2006). 
This struggle increases political pressure on governments, which in return reduces the 
credibility of the long-term price signal. Emissions trading schemes (e.g. EU ETS) – as well as 
taxes – therefore are more of a short-term tool that provides incentives to increase energy 
efficiency by incremental improvements rather than the development of breakthrough 
technologies.  
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Appendix 1: Options to address power price increases: alleviation and 
compensation measures 
A)  Alleviation measures  
Alleviation measures aim at changing the incentive structure and the functioning of the 
allowance market essentially through regulation. Attention is needed to ensure that such 
measures do not impede efficiency of the EU ETS, power or other markets. The following 
alleviation measures have been considered: 
a)  Some have argued that the auctioning of allowances, as long as it is combined with revenue 
recycling, could be a suitable way to address the competitiveness issue. Auctioning ensures 
that all participants are treated in the same way. In addition, it is preferable from an 
efficiency point of view and reflects the ‘polluter-pays’ principle. Finally, it generates 
revenues to be recycled to address public policy objectives, such as reduction of other taxes, 
or to address market distortions. The disadvantages on the other hand are well-known: it 
increases the cost for participating industries and is comparable to a tax and hence enjoys 
little political acceptability. Recycling of revenues can mitigate these effects, but it is not 
evident how to do this efficiently. It then becomes a matter of the management of a 
‘secondary allocation’. Of particular concern are internal market issues and the role of the 
EU but also the impact on companies’ cash flow. Most important, however, is the temporary 
limitation of auctioning under the current Directive, i.e. 5% and 10% maximum, for the first 
and second period respectively. While some have argued that the Directive would allow for 
a higher level of auctioning as long as it is accompanied by full recycling, the issue would 
almost certainly have to be settled by the European Court of Justice. For the medium and 
longer term, this would lead to a shift to less carbon-intensive fuels, most likely gas. Such a 
shift to gas could further increase import dependency on mainly Russian gas, potentially 
increasing risks associated with security of supply. The effects of higher power prices of 
course could be offset by the revenue recycling, depending on the exact rules for 
recycling.
15 
b)  Reducing the CO2 allowance price has sometimes been mentioned as a possible measure. 
This could be done for example by relaxing the overall cap of the covered sector or by 
encouraging the influx of CDM and JI credits into the EU ETS as a result of the Linking 
Directive. Relaxing the overall cap implies that emissions reductions will have to be 
undertaken by other sectors – given the Kyoto Protocol’s targets – which is likely to 
increase overall compliance costs for member states, as low-cost reduction options in the 
covered sector would be omitted. On the other hand, compensating for the relaxing of the 
overall cap by member states using the Kyoto Protocol’s project mechanisms (i.e. CDM/JI 
credits) is likely to run against current political, technical and other constraints related to 
those mechanisms. While the EU can attempt to address them, it will need the cooperation 
of all international partners in the UNFCCC. Encouraging the influx of CDM/JI credits 
through the Linking Directive faces the same difficulties. The purchase of AAUs by 
member states, as an alternative, might be politically difficult unless such AAUs are 
‘greened’ through for example the Green Investment Scheme (GIS), which earmarks 
revenues from the sale of excess AAUs for projects that reduce greenhouse gas emissions. 
Ultimately, the use of flexible mechanisms finds its limit in the Kyoto Protocol’s and the 
Linking Directive’s supplementary provisions.  
                                                 
15 The effect on power prices remains uncertain. In theory, 100 percent free allocation, benchmarking or 
auctioning would lead to the same level of CO2 cost pass through and, hence, similar power prices. In 
practice, however, the level of pass through could depend on the allocation method.  20 | EGENHOFER, FUJIWARA, ÅHMAN & ZETTERBERG 
 
c)  Another option that has been discussed to limit the CO2 price is to set a maximum price on 
an EU allowance, but this is not a viable option for the second period (2008-12) as the 
current Directive does not allow the setting of a maximum price.
16 Moreover, setting a 
maximum price risks missing the environmental objective of the covered sector with the 
consequence that reductions would have to be achieved by other sectors, which would 
increase overall compliance costs. Another downside of setting a maximum price is that it 
would reduce liquidity and therefore may actually undermine trading activity and so could 
be seen as ‘managing a market’. There are equally institutional issues associated with such a 
price cap, notably who decides on it and under what procedure.  
d)  A possible measure that has been discussed is a system of allocation  of emissions 
allowances based on relative quota or a Performance Standard Rate (PSR) such as an 
energy/carbon efficiency benchmark per unit of output. A benchmark could be multiplied 
by the expected output to determine the allowance ex-ante or alternatively, multiplied by the 
realised output, i.e. with ex-post adjustment. The major advantages are that it would 
virtually avoid windfall profits, reward carbon efficiency and be popular with industry since 
it is less restrictive of economic growth. There are a number of shortcomings, however: 
lower economic efficiency, less environmental certainty and higher information and other 
transaction costs. The principal issue is that a relative quota system does not fit into the 
present Directive (and the political consensus) and hence could not be implemented before 
2012.  
e)  A regulatory measure would be to restrict power price increases – either at the wholesale or 
retail level – to avoid passing through of opportunity costs. Instead power companies would 
only be allowed to pass through the real, average costs of CO2 allowances. While such a 
mechanism would restrict power price increases beyond average costs and eliminate 
windfall profits, it would radically alter the incentive structure of the ETS. Such a proposal 
would counter the ETS’ intention to set a price for CO2 and include this into the marginal 
cost of production including power. There is no reason to treat carbon separately from other 
cost factors, especially costs stemming from the abatement of NOx, SO2 or other pollutants. 
This raises the fundamental question on how to reconcile such an approach with one of the 
key objectives of the internal energy market, namely providing undistorted price signals 
based on full marginal costs, such as fuel, labour and environmental costs including carbon 
costs. In essence, this would constitute a move back to a regulated market. Furthermore, 
regulators have limited, if any instruments at hand to regulate whole sale prices. There are a 
number of implementation issues although member states could impose some sort of a 
‘voluntary agreement’ between energy-intensive industries and power generators (Sijm et 
al., 2005: 92). As a result, such regulation would create additional inefficiencies in the 
power market. Intervention in the power market of that kind is likely to distort production, 
consumption and as a consequence investment decisions. It would almost certainly increase 
total power demand as the costs of CO2 would not be internalised, with higher emissions. De 
facto, it would mean that the power sector would be largely ‘sheltered’ from the carbon 
constraint. ‘Exempting’ the power sector despite the Kyoto commitment would mean that 
costs of emission reductions are pushed to other sectors in the economy, which would be 
economically detrimental. 
 
                                                 
16 The current penalty price of 40/100 €/tonne, for the first respective second period is not designed as a 
price cap. Non-compliant installations are required in addition to paying the penalty to surrender the 
allowance in the following period and are subject to public announcement of their non-compliance 
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B) Compensation  measures 
Compensation measures attempt to correct undesirable effects of the EU ETS from a societal 
perspective. When assessing their relative merits, it is important to assess the potential 
environmental, economic or social effects against the principal objectives of the ETS, i.e. to 
reduce CO2 emissions in a cost-effective way. There are a number of compensation measures 
including government support in the form of tax breaks, other reductions of burdens, 
government subsidies, re-distributed ‘windfall taxes’, but also more subtle mechanisms that 
could work through the ETS. They also raise a number of questions, however. 
The fundamental assumption upon which compensation or redistribution rests depends on 
whether energy-intensive companies choose to cross-subsidise their production by the amount 
of the compensation they have received – at least in the short-term – or whether they base their 
investment decisions on opportunity costs, meaning that the revenues are invested where they 
promise the highest return, i.e. possibly in other regions than the EU. Hence, compensation 
measures would need to be designed to create incentives for investing in the EU.  
Another critical element is where the financial resources for compensation come from and how 
they are redistributed. If it is the government that compensates, it is likely that revenues will 
first be collected via a tax on windfall profits, auctioning, or through other measures. 
Compensation raises many equity issues and internal market issues.  
•  An option that has been discussed intensively (e.g. in various CEPS Task Forces) is indirect 
allocation of emissions allowances. In such a system of grandfathering, electricity users 
receive emissions allowances for free while power generators are responsible for 
surrendering allowances according to their actual emissions. They would buy their 
allowances from the energy-intensive sector, for which this would constitute compensation. 
While this would allow for full pass-through of CO2 costs (the intended objective of the 
ETS), reduce possible windfall profits and compensate energy-intensive industries, it raises 
issues of fairness for the non-covered sector and households remain uncompensated. 
Including them in such a scheme would, however, increase the complexity of the EU ETS 
significantly. Furthermore, those energy-intensive sectors that in fact are able to pass 
through the cost increases due to higher power prices would be compensated twice, reaping 
in fact windfall profits.  
•  Another option that has been mentioned is border tax adjustments for costs incurred from 
procuring CO2 emissions allowances. Such border tax adjustment would do away with 
leakage and in addition allow EU member states to design the ETS largely free from 
international competitiveness concerns. Uncertain is still whether such measures are feasible 
in practice and in political terms, not only vis-à-vis the US but also developing countries 
that by now are the major competitors of EU energy-intensive industries. 
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Appendix 2: Improving investment certainty of the ETS  
There have been discussions on how to create greater stability and predictability for the covered 
sectors of the EU ETS. We attempt to review a number of options including allocation-related 
solutions (e.g. a 14-year guaranteed allocation based on fuel-specific benchmarks in the German 
NAP I), the alignment of targets with the investment cycle by using for example long-term 
efficiency targets as a basis for setting a cap for the manufacturing industry, benchmarks and 
auctioning, or the so-called ‘TenYear Rule’,
17 long-term indicative targets or a ceiling on the 
allowance price.
18  
a.  The most obvious option is longer allocation periods to ensure predictability and certainty. 
A critical precondition for longer allocation periods however is that efficiency indicators at 
installation level are in line with long-term climate change objectives (e.g. fuel-neutral 
benchmarks).  
b.  Closely linked are rules for new entry and closures and a possible re-design to add more 
certainty. This could already be dealt with in NAP phase II. Nevertheless, they run up 
against the fact that the Directive has foreseen multiple short allocation periods, making it 
difficult to extend certainty beyond these periods.  
c.  There is strong interest and support among member states to further analyse and develop 
benchmarks. In order to do so, there is a need to ensure: i) consistency across member states 
on both the types of benchmarks (e.g. fuel, technology or product-specific), ii) the metrics 
to apply (e.g. installed capacity, projected utilisation rates, projected output or best available 
technology and techniques, and iii) data availability. Given the different approaches used by 
member states, it is unlikely that EU-wide benchmarks will play a major role in NAP phase 
II, unless some sectors would opt for such an approach. 
d.  Long-term efficiency targets for the manufacturing industry, for example based on 
benchmarks, are another potential way to increase long-term certainty for the sector. The 
principal item is how such a system could be incorporated into the EU ETS, which operates 
on absolute caps. Setting relative targets would transform the ETS into a baseline and credit 
scheme, which is not foreseen under the Directive. Hence, this becomes a topic for the 2006 
review. However, nothing would stop member states from basing their allocation to the 
energy-intensive sectors on long-term efficiency targets.  
e.  Using auctioning in combination with recycling of revenues has also been proposed as a 
possible way to create investment incentives as it is thought that it would create a more 
reliable long-term price signals. The downside is that auctioning would have a negative 
impact on companies’ profits of energy-intensive industries and thereby might lead to 
change of investment patterns over the longer term. In addition, this would open a 
‘secondary allocation’ debate on how to recycle revenues and raise questions on the 
mechanisms of auctioning.  
f.  A so-called ‘ten-year rule’ (Åhman et al., 2005) has been proposed to balance efficiency 
considerations, including investment, with perceived issues of fairness. This concept 
attempts to acknowledge the need both to compensate incumbent installations for sunk costs 
and not to discriminate against new entrants for reasons of fairness. It can be used for both 
                                                 
17 Under the Ten-Year Rule (see 3.5), a member state will allocate allowances based on the average of, 
say, three reference years (e.g. 2000-2002) for 10 years. After ten years, the reference years would be 
updated on a rolling basis, i.e. from 2000-02 to 2001-03, etc. Hence, there is some compensation for sunk 
costs but not forever. A new entrant would receive allowances from a reserve according to emission rate 
benchmarks (to be standardised across the EU member states). 
18 For more details see Egenhofer & Fujiwara (2006), pp. 16-21.  THE EU EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME: TAKING STOCK AND LOOKING AHEAD | 23 
 
emissions and performance-based allocation. The main criticism has been the risk that 
insufficient reserves for new entrants would deter new investment. 
g.  To provide a signal to the power sector, the idea has been proposed to develop long-term 
indicative targets for the EU as a whole, or, if more appropriate, for the relevant national or 
regional markets. In order for such an indicative target to serve its purpose, it would require 
extending them far beyond the short-term allocation periods. This would imply, however, 
that member states develop energy strategies on how to arrive at the needed reductions. 
Another issue is the legal nature of such indicative targets. Non-binding targets have very 
often been of little practical effect, as can be seen from the EU energy efficiency targets in 
the 1980s, or more recently, from ‘soft’ targets agreed under the Lisbon agenda. In order to 
be effective, targets could be attached to a revised EU ETS, in much the same way that 
indicative targets have been formulated in the Annex of the Renewables Directive. Long-
term certainty would be helped by a common EU energy policy.  
h.  Another proposal has been a ceiling on the allowance price (i.e. price cap) which would 
provide long-term certainty as the upper limit of the allowance price and hence, the 
investment incentive is set. This raises however questions both on the environmental effects 
as reductions would not necessarily be achieved and on the functioning of the allowance 
market as it could reduce liquidity. Moreover, if the ceiling is too low, the incentive for 
reductions would be equally low. In fact such a system would become in effect a carbon tax. 
There is high risk that governments would give in to pressure from industry for a low 
ceiling. In any case, setting the ceiling is a highly politicised act and this by itself could 
increase uncertainty again. One of the issues to be settled is to how and by whom the price 
cap would be decided. 24 | 
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About the European Climate Platform 
ECP 
The ECP is a joint initiative of the Climate Policy Research Programme 
(Clipore) of the Swedish Foundation for Strategic Environmental Research 
(Mistra) in Stockholm and the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) in 
Brussels. Established in 2005, the ECP aims to facilitate interaction within 
the policy research community, mainly but not exclusively in Europe. Its 
working methods consist of bringing together  a select number of policy-
makers, negotiators and experts to vigorously debate key topics in the area 
of international climate change policy and to widely disseminate its 
conclusions. The ECP actively seeks dialogue with policy-makers and other 
stakeholders while being dedicated to academic excellence, unqualified 
independence and policy relevance. The ECP is governed by a steering 
group, drawn from government and academia. For further information, see: 
http://www.ceps.be/Article.php?article_id=484 . 
About the Climate Policy Research Programme 
CLIPORE 
Clipore is an international research programme that aims to stimulate policy-
oriented research that contributes to moving forward global efforts to combat 
climate change. A steady and integrated process of research and dialogue 
with stakeholders lies at the foundation of the Clipore programme: spawning, 
developing, sharing, scrutinizing and refining ideas. The programme is 
comprised of two large climate policy research projects, independent 
university positions and the Clipore Policy Forum. For more information see: 
http://www.clipore.org  
About the Centre for European Policy Studies 
CEPS 
Situated in the nexus between academia, business and policy-making, 
CEPS performs a unique role as an independent analyst and critic of 
European policy. CEPS’ core expertise is the conduct of policy research on 
European affairs including climate change and the broad dissemination of its 
findings through a regular flow of publications and events. (See: 
www.ceps.be on CEPS in general and for a description of its energy, climate 
change and sustainable development programme: 
http://www.ceps.be/Article.php?article_id=12 ). 
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